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'OPERATION GROUNDNUTS':
LESSONS FROM AN AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SCHEME
Elizabeth Hopkins*
In 1964, a large-scale agricultural extension scheme was initiated in
Senegal's 'groundnut basin'. It was run by a French company, and its
main objective was to increase groundnut production by 25%, to
reach a total production of a million tonnes. Instead, average sales of
groundnuts actually declined over the period of the project. What
were the reasons for this embarrassing result? And how far were the
problems which arose due to the structure of the scheme? Our
research was designed to look at the scheme from the point of view
of individual farmers, but as a by-product we can offer some
tentative answers to these questions.
It could be argued that the scheme was doomed to failure simply
because of its scale. Certainly it was ambitious, covering a total area
of some 24,000 square miles, with an agricultural population of
about 1 million (a quarter of the total population of Senegal). The
aim in the initial stages was blanket coverage of all farmers in the
area, which inevitably led to an over-simplification of
recommendations: advisers had to offer universal panaceas rather
than individual prescriptions. However, (on paper at least) the
administrative organization of the scheme was a model of its kind.
The head office in Dakar exercised overall supervision, and employed
several agronomists (and even one sociologist!) At local level, each of
the three regions covered was under the overall command of a
regional director, with university qualifications and broad
experience. Within the regions, each arrondissement (district) was
in charge of a district supervisor (about 45 in all), with at least
technical agricultural qualifications, each of whom was responsible
* The fieldwork on which this article is based was carried out between 1968 and
1971, supported mainly by the Social Science Research Council (through IDS),
with invaluable financial and practical assistance from SATEC consultants. No
other publications have yet appeared, but field data and various interim reports
may be consulted in the IDS library. A D.Phil thesis for the University of Sussex,
entitled Wolof Farmers in Senegal: a study of responses to an agricultural
extension scheme, is forthcoming.
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for about 20 village level workers. These men were chosen from the
local farming community; they had usually (though not always)
attended primary school, but they had no formal agricultural
qualifications. Each was in charge of a sector with an average area of
some 50 square km., containing normally 8 or 9 villages. Instructions
were passed down this chain of command, and regular training
sessions were organized; conversely, information about field
conditions and achievements was supposed to pass upwards, so that
policies could be revised where necessary.
Inevitably, communication was imperfect. In the early stages of
the scheme, all the workers at the level of district supervisor and
above (probably totalling at least 70 people, including the staff of
the Dakar head office) were non-Senegalese: mainly French, they
included a few from other European countries to emphasize the
E.E.C. nature of the project. Despite all efforts, it was hard to bridge
the gulf between them and the village-level workers, with their
imperfect knowledge of French and their ignorance of technical
terms. As the scheme proceeded, Senegalese nationals gradually took
over, so that by 1971 only about 20 Europeans remained. Language
barriers became less significant, but there was still a gulf of training
and outlook which meant that many facts which appeared
commonplace to village-level workers were not grasped by the higher
echelons (and, of course, vice-versa). Perhaps some of these
misunderstandings could have been eliminated by more thorough
pilot projects: but the scheme had to be accelerated for political
reasons, and the French company was proud of the speed with which
the network was installed.
In explaining the 'failure' of the scheme, however, there are even
more basic reasons which must be considered. If an agricultural
extension scheme is to 'succeed' (in terms of its own objectives), the
first precondition must be that its aims coincide with those of the
farmers who are being advised. Because this condition was not
fulfilled, one might say that the Senegalese scheme was doomed to
'fail'. The discrepancy in aims between farmers and advisers arose
partly from the special conditions in which Senegal found itself in
the early 1960s. EEC rules demanded the phasing-out of the
privileged entry of Senegalese groundnuts on to the French market
by 1968. As 80% of Senegal's export earnings came from groundnuts
and groundnut products, sold almost exclusively to France, this was
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a serious threat to the economy; it was estimated that, allowing for
multiplier effects, the likely 25% fall in export price might reduce
the G.D.P. by as much as 10%. Lacking alternative major export
prospects, Senegal's only hope of maintaining her export earnings
seemed to be to sell more groundnuts at the lower prices she now
faced: hence the objective of a 25% increase in groundnut
production. In other words, the scheme was designed with
macro-economic ends in view.
From the point of view of individual farmers, the appeal of
increasing groundnut production at a time of falling prices was far
from obvious. In considering their reactions, it is important to realize
that groundnuts are not a new crop in the area. On the contrary,
they have been grown since the end of the last century by peasant
farmers, who are thus fully attuned to participation in a market
economy. Many farmers recall that during the 1950s and early 1960s
they (or their fathers) grew almost exclusively groundnuts, relying on
the proceeds from their sale to buy food for their families. The food
they bought was mainly rice, since there is no large-scale trade in
millet or sorghum (the basic subsistence crops of the area). But
between 1963 and 1968 the producer price of groundñuts fell by
25%, while the price of rice rose by about 35%. Whereas in 1963 a
kilogram of rice could be bought by selling 1½ kg. of groundnuts, by
1968 nearly 3 kg. were needed. As relative prices have changed,
farmers have responded in an 'economically rational' manner, by
devoting more of their own resources to growing food, and thus
cutting down groundnut production. This tendency has been
reinforced by climatic conditions in the years since the extension
scheme began. Even before the present catastrophic drought, the
rainy seasons of 1966, 1968 and 1970 were all extremely poor, in
terms both of total rainfall and its distribution through the season.
As well as having a direct effect on groundnut yields, this probably
caused farmers to shift back towards subsistence production. After a
bad year, food prices are likely to be even higher, whereas
government-fixed groundnut prices do not respond to changes in
output. If a farmer does achieve a food surplus in a poor year, he is
sure to find a profitable market, and by concentrating on food crops
he is more likely at least to be able to feed his family. With a run of
poor years, prudence dictated a return to food crops, reinforcing tbe
economic incentive of relative price changes.
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Of course Senegal's situation in relation to the French market,
which gave rise to this particular conflict of aims, was unusual, but it
cannot be dismissed as unique. Even if other countries do not have to
cope with a withdrawal of price supports, they may well face a
decline in world prices for their major exports, in a situation where
the possibilities of diversification are limited. However, there is a
more basic problem which may prove equally disastrous for
extension schemes: a government programme must take a long-term
perspective, which will probably not correspond with the
time-horizons of individual farmers. For example, the Senegalese
scheme has found it difficult to arouse interest in long-term measures
for restoring soil fertility, which involve expenditure of money and
effort now for the sake of some (doubtful) future gain. Moreover,
farmers who begin to use draught often do so not, as the scheme
intended, in order to make more intensive use of their existing land,
but in order to be able to cultivate a larger area. Extensive farming in
many parts of the groundnut basin does give a higher yield per
man-day (though not, of course, per hectare) than the intensive
techniques advised by the scheme. The extension service and the
government must look ahead to the day when land will be the scarce
resource to which returns have to be maximised, but in areas where
land is still plentiful one cannot expect individual farmers to be so
foresighted. On the contrary, they have an interest in acquiring
cultivation rights over as much land as possible, against the day when
it does become scarce. The granting of credit (in this case through
cooperatives) can encounter similar problems. When ready cash is
scarce and private credit rates are high (as much as 150% interest
may be demanded for a 6 month loan), it may be perfectly logical
from an individual's point of view to obtain fertilizer or equipment
on credit from a cooperative, and sell it immediately to raise cash
rather than using it to increase his output. From the national point
of view, however, this may well be seen as a non-optimal use of
cooperative credit.
Some of these conflicts of aims could have been resolved. For
example, since groundnuts are now marketed entirely through
cooperatives, it would have been possible to adopt a different price
policy. Instead of allowing the producer price to fall in step with the
export price, some of the funds allocated to the extension scheme
could have been used to support the producer price, at least until the
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new production techniques had been adopted and the resulting yield
increases appreciated by farmers. In fact, the Fonds Européen de
Développement has recently decided to finance such a subsidy
temporarily, as the only hope of restimulating groundnut production
in Senegal. Even if producer prices had been supported, some
movement away from groundnut production might still have taken
place because of the climatic factors discussed above; but even these
would have affected projected results less if the projections had been
more realistic. As late as 1971, the extension service was still basing
projections on the assumption that one year in four would be 'bad',
whereas recent figures suggested that to assume one 'bad' year in two
would be nearer the truth. There was over-optimism, too, about
farmers' capacity to withstand bad years. For example, the
recommended fertilization programme for groundnuts, based on
research station data (with unlimited weeding labour available), gave
increases in yields which more than covered the annual costs, taking
good years with bad. But after sustaining losses in a bad year farmers
could not risk indebting themselves further in the next year in the
hope of achieving profits if the rains were good (and if they were
able to cope with the increased weed growth). It is not surprising
that after the poor rains of 1968 purchases of groundnut fertilizer
fell from the 44,000 tonnes of 1967 to a mere 10,000 tonnes in
1969 (although it did seem to surprise the government, which had
entered into a forward contract with the local fertilizer company).
The more basic problems, like the divergence of time horizons, may
prove to be insoluble - which does not mean that they should be
ignored.
Although it failed to achieve its main objective, this extension
scheme has had effects which may prove to be far more significant in
the long run than a mere increase in groundnut output. At least in its
early stages, the scheme was a 'mass' one, with recommendations
addressed to all farmers, but some were obviously in a better position
to respond than others. Those who have been enterprising or
fortunate enough to grasp the new opportunities are drawing rapidly
ahead of their neighbours, taking possession of the spare land and
gaining privileged access to official credit facilities and to extension
advice; they are the beneficiaries of the new 'selective' schemes.
Those who have been foolish or badly-advised enough to over-equip
themselves may be poorer than before, because the debts they have
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incurred have not been matched by increases in output. (The Fonds
Européen de Développement found this problem so worrying that
part of its new aid to Senegal is being used to annul bad debts at the
cooperatives which should have interesting implications for future
repayment rates). Moreover, the introduction of draught equipment
has tended to make farming households more independent of each
other. When essential operations can be performed more quickly,
there arc fewer crises (e.g. fields choked with weeds) in which the
assistance of neighbours is required. Exchanges of labour between
households are increasingly taking place on a paid basis, instead of
the traditional 'labour parties'. There are even signs that relationships
within households may be changing, with young men (whether
relatives or seasonal labourers) asking to be paid for the work they
do for the household head in cash, instead of simply being allocated
a plot of land to cultivate. At the moment, there are no genuinely
landless labourers in this part of Senegal; every adult farms at least
one plot whose output belongs solely to the cultivator, even if the
land is 'owned' by someone else. It seems unlikely that this situation
can continue indefinitely, as land becomes more scarce (natural
population increase in this area is swelled by inward migration) and
as inequalities between households increase, but it is too soon to
foresee the form which changes will take.
While the visible benefits of the extension scheme have been
unevenly distributed, there has been at least one virtually universal
effect. Not only has the scheme trained its own workers (which was
one of the original objectives), it has also trained thousands of
farmers. Even those who have rejected the advice offered to them
have been forced at least to consider the possibility of adopting new
techniques. They have had to evaluate proposals and make choices,
and in most cases they have been highly rational in accepting the
techniques which appealed to them (e.g. new seed varieties for food
crops were enthusiastically adopted, and purchases of fertilizer for
grain increased steadily even when groundnut fertilizer was rejected).
Farmers have certainly become more aware and more articulate in
their dealings with matters outside their own immediate
environment. In particular, this has led to violent criticisms of such
bodies as the cooperatives, as instruments of a government policy
which is seen as trying to make farmers work harder on the one
hand, and cheating them on the other. 'If the cooperative were a
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man', wrote the secretary of one radio listening group, 'we should
have killed him long ago'.
The apparent failure to give any consideration to the deep social
implications of the extension scheme warrants much more serious
criticism than the failure to achieve specific production targets, yet it
is in terms of production targets that the 'success' or 'failure' of this
scheme has been discussed by the aid-giving bodies and the
Senegalese government. What is particularly worrying is that this
narrowness of approach may be an inevitable feature of the way in
which the scheme was organized, which seems to be general practice
for schemes financed by E.E.C. aid (as this one was in its later
stages). Projects are put out to tender and the contract is awarded to
the chosen company. This happened in this case to be a French
company, the Société d'Aide Technique et de Cooperation, which is
a société d'état (based on state capital), but it could have been any
one of its numerous competitors in Europe, some of which are
wholly private companies. Although the personnel of these
companies exhibit a high degree of technical competence and of
commitment to the projects in which they are engaged, their primary
loyalty must be to the company which employs them. To treat
agricultural development as though it were a series of road-building
projects, to be handled piecemeal by commercial companies, has
obvious dangers. These appeared only too clearly in Senegal, where
privately-run schemes to encourage peasant production of cotton,
confectionery, groundnuts and tobacco respectively (not to mention
the normal government extension service) were all operating in the
same area as the SATEC project. Each had its funds and its
objectives, and each insisted on going its separate way, often to the
bewilderment of the farmers.
Of course, such companies do offer technical skills which are
lacking in less developed countries. The Senegalese would certainly
have been unable to carry out an agricultural development
programme of this magnitude without considerable technical
assistance; the question is whether the form in which they received
that assistance defeated its own ends. This is a question with which
we in Britain should now be seriously concerned, since as members
of the EEC we are committed to offering aid to be disbursed in this
way (and British firms are eligible to tender for projects). As well as
the obvious dangers of a piecemeal approach, there are other
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problems. Can private firms employed on pre-project studies be
relied upon to produce unbiased reports when they intend to tender
for the projects? Can firms actually deliver what they promise in
tenders, when they offer their most experienced staff for several
projects simultaneously? How many of the firms in this 'business' are
(unlike SATEC), purely private companies, concerned primarily with
their own profits? We need answers to these and other questions
before we can decide whether aid given through schemes operated by
private companies can genuinely help development. Will it simply
lead to a series of uncoordinated projects whose 'success' or 'failure'
in terms of their own objectives is ultimately irrelevant to
development?
